Wednesday, 30 January 2013

Mali: Here we go again


by Sheldon Richman
January 28, 2013

In testimony before Senate and House committees, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton enthusiastically endorsed increased U.S. intervention in Africa. When government officials seem incapable of learning obvious lessons from the recent past, maybe their incentive is not to learn but to keep doing the same destructive things.

President Obama’s inaugural speech contained this line, which has gone quite overlooked: “America will remain the anchor of strong alliances in every corner of the globe. And we will renew those institutions that extend our capacity to manage crisis abroad.”

That’s a recipe for perpetual war and perpetual fiscal crisis.

The latest locale for American intervention is the west African country of Mali. Aside from whatever covert activity the U.S. government may be conducting there, the American role is said to consist of logistical support for France, Mali’s former colonial overlord, which has intervened militarily to defend a central corrupt government. (The deadly hostage-takings in Algeria may have been retaliation for France’s action.) As the New York Times reports, “The Pentagon is airlifting a French battalion to join the fight in Mali against Islamist militants, Pentagon and administration officials said.” Ominously, the Times adds, “The airlift expands the involvement of the United States in support of a NATO ally, but officials stressed that the American military footprint on the ground in Mali would remain small.” That is, there’s already an American footprint on the ground.

Such is how quagmires begin.

What’s going on in Mali that requires U.S. meddling? It’s a complicated and murky story that goes back to the repression of the separatist ethnic group, the Tuaregs, in northern Mali and, writes Jeremy Keenan, the Algerian government’s effort after Sept. 11, 2001, to concoct a “terrorist threat” to motivate the U.S. government to pay for modernization of its army. Seeing Africa as a rich source of oil, gas, and other resources, the Bush administration was happy to get involved in the region. (Got to keep the Chinese away.)

While the Obama administration sounds alarms about al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), reporter Patrick Cockburn notes that


Tuareg nationalist insurgency, not radical Islam, is at the heart of the crisis in Mali. What, for instance, are AQIM doing in northern Mali, which has never in the past been a bastion for fundamentalists? AQIM is in origin an Algerian movement that emerged from the civil war of the 1990s. Formed in 1998, its members moved to northern Mali in 2003, where the government saw it as a counterbalance to Tuareg separatists.…

The strange truth is that it was the Malian government which, over the last 10 years, tolerated AQIM in northern Mali and allowed it to operate, taking a share in the profits of its kidnapping and drug-running operations. International military aid for use against al-Qa’ida was diverted for use against the Tuareg.

A key precursor to the latest episode was the 2011 U.S. and NATO intervention in Libya, which overthrew the government of Muammar Qaddafi and provided a cornucopia of weapons. When the regime-change operation ended, well-armed Tuaregs, who had fought for Qaddafi, returned to northern Mali to pursue their separatist aims. After expelling the central government’s army, they declared independence last April, after a coup overthrew the government in Bamako. Tuaregs also live in neighbouring Algeria, Niger, Libya, and Burkina Faso, and a successful separatist movement in Mali could spread throughout the region, which those countries would abhor.

The Tuareg movement, Keenan writes, was co-opted by jihadists linked to the Algerian intelligence service, and these jihadists have imposed sharia law and have committed horrendous violence. Thus, he wrote, “Washington’s Global War on Terror has come home to roost for the peoples of the Sahara.”

These events now provide the excuse for the latest Western intervention. When will it end?

The lesson is clear: Internationalizing local, often ethnic, conflicts has consequences that furnish the pretext for further intervention. Inevitably, innocents are killed, while the American power elite pursues its geopolitical aims and the military-industrial complex prospers.

Moreover, intervention — once again on behalf of a corrupt and brutal government — makes enemies of those who would otherwise present no threat to the American people. Nothing helps jihadi recruitment like Western occupation.

As a cover for imperialism, the war on terror has worn thin.

http://fff.org/explore-freedom/article/mali-here-we-go-again/

Saturday, 26 January 2013

Algeria hostage crisis could weaken veteran spymaster Mediene



More cock-up than dirty trick, In Amenas raises questions about competence of Tewfik Mediene and brutal security apparatus
General Mohamed 'Tewfik' Mediene
General Mohamed 'Tewfik' Mediene, Algeria's rarely photographer spymaster, is considered by some to be more powerful the country's president
If anyone in Algeria knows the full story of what happened at the In Amenas gas facility in the Sahara it is General Mohamed "Tewfik" Mediene. And he, characteristically, is not talking.
As the echoes of the hostage drama reverberate across north Africa, the mysterious head of the DRS intelligence agency is leading the effort to hunt down the jihadists who orchestrated the raid.
His deputy, General Bashir Tartag, commanded the assault that ended the most high-profile terrorist incident to take place on Algerian soil, threatening vital gas exports to the west. Tartag, known as "Le Bombardier", also has a reputation for brutality and ambition.
Mediene, 73 and in poor health, has stayed in the shadows. Described as "the God of Algiers", the spymaster is the most powerful man in the country after President Abdelaziz Bouteflika – and perhaps a candidate to succeed him; some say he is even more powerful.
"Algeria has long been governed, alternately more and less behind the scenes, by varying groups of men known collectively as 'le pouvoir' [the power]," US diplomats said in a 2007 cable released by WikiLeaks. "It has become increasingly clear that the "pouvoir" now consists primarily of Mediene and Bouteflika."
The 75-year-old president was absent throughout the crisis, undergoing medical treatment in Geneva. Mediene and the army, say well-placed sources, kept him out of the picture because they were angry that his agreement to let French planes fly over Algeria to attack Islamist rebels in Mali was leaked from Paris.
The Algerian regime is famously opaque. Photographs of Mediene are rare – duringat official ceremonies cameras systematically avoid his face. "Mediene meets other security chiefs. The French, the Americans, the Russians, probably the Saudis and maybe the Egyptians. But only the big boys," says a European analyst.
Born in Kabylie in 1939, Mediene served in the French colonial army and deserted after the start of the FLN revolt in 1954. Trained by the KGB, he was promoted after the 1988 riots and became head of the DRS in 1990 – which probably makes him the longest-serving head of any intelligence agency in the world.
Mediene was a tough and influential figure at a crucial moment in 1992 when the military cancelled elections that Islamists were poised to win, triggering a bloody civil war that claimed about 150,000 lives over the next few years. He was with the hardline "eradicateurs", not the "conciliateurs" who backed negotiations.
Under his command the DRS infiltrated armed groups and was accused of committing massacres to discredit its enemies – some of whom later morphed into al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Allegations of torture were rife.
"Their operating manual was straight KGB," says Jeremy Keenan, an Algeria expert at London University. "That means creating your own terrorists, setting up parallel trade unions so nobody knows what's going on, and then atomise them. It's the most stunning form of control. Mediene is absolutely ruthless."
It is a backhanded tribute to Mediene's formidable reputation that some have suggested the In Amenas attack was another DRS dirty trick designed to "prove" the danger of jihadi extremism. Details about the raid remain confused and there is concern about the way that it was handled by the Algerian authorities. But there is no evidence that it was not a genuine terrorist incident. It looks much more like a cock-up than a conspiracy.
"The DRS is a powerful agency in Algeria but it is wrong to think that it can control everything," says Francis Ghiles, a Maghreb analyst at the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs. "This was a major failure for Algerian security. They would not have been complicit in something like this. Mediene's whole raison d'etre is to make Algeria secure."
In Amenas may well turn out to have weakened the veteran security chief.
"Bouteflika got rid of a lot of people who opposed him but he has not been able to stop the DRS," says George Joffe, a consultant on Algeria.
"Tartag has been rather badly damaged. The system over which he and Mediene preside has been shown to be incompetent at a time that the succession to Bouteflika has not been resolved. People know there was a level of incompetence that is frightening and a level of brutality that was probably unnecessary. That raises questions about the competence of the DRS."

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/25/algerian-hostage-crisis-tewfik-mediene